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Support for a Humanitarian
Jus in Bello
Maintenance of the distinction betweenjus in bello (law of war) andjus con-
tra belum (law against war) is crucial for the effectiveness of the former. The
efficacy of the laws of war depends upon their being supported regardless of
who started the war or for what reason. Questions about aggression and self-
defense, about whose cause is just, must be considered a separate subject in
order for combatants and civilians to be protected and assisted. It is of central
importance, therefore, to examine the degree of support for this traditional
distinction manifested at the recently concluded Geneva Diplomatic Confer-
ence on Humanitarian Law.'
It is hardly sufficient to note that two Protocols additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 were adopted at that Conference and from this
to conclude that there was widespread support for a humanitarianjus in bello
entirely separate from any concern about causes of war and motivation of
fighters.2 In theory, the Protocols could contain concepts violating the tradi-
tional distinction. In fact, that very charge was levied by certain delegations at
the Conference. Also in fact, attacks on the distinction did occur.
This brief essay will outline Conference developments on three issues: a
general and explicit assault on the traditional distinction by the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam; an alleged assault on the distinction by third world and
socialist states in their support for the adopted article on "material field of ap-
plication" of Protocol I on international armed conflict; and a clear assault on
the distinction concerning humanitarian protection of mercenaries.
*Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska. B.A. Wake Forest University; M.A.
and Ph.D. Princeton University. The author would like to thank the Ford Foundation for grants
enabling him to attend the third and fourth sessions of the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian
Law, after his being present at the first two sessions as a consultant to the International Red Cross.
'The Conference convened in 1974, ran until 1977, and was preceded by meetings of individual
and governmental experts hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Its
further origins are usually traced to resolutions of the Red Cross Conference and to resolutions
emanating from the United Nations Teheran Conference on Human Rights.
'Final Act of the Conference, 10 June 1977.
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The DRVN and Humanitarian Law
At the 1974 session of the four-session Conference, the DRVN tabled a
document indicating clearly its rejection of humanitarianjus in bello as a body
of law separate from questions of aggression and self-defense. 3 In this author's
view, the proposal constitutes the most explicit rationale thus far available for
that state's behavior in the Vietnam war toward detained American personnel.
For the DRVN, the traditional separation of two bodies of law dealing with
violence "has proved to be inadequate" and "a flagrant anomaly."
Humanitarian law has to be integrated Withjus contra bellum. The traditional
concern for equal rights and impartiality is "outdated" because of "the
absence of a concept of justice." The highest purpose of humanitarian law
should be to fight imperialism. That law should also condemn aggression. One
specific result of this approach is that "all those who commit international
crimes related to armed conflicts and who are caught in the act shall not be en-
titled to prisoner-of-war status." Thus if one fights for "imperialism," one is
not protected under humanitarian law. And so on.
This attitude, negating entirely ajus in bello, traditionally accepted for more
than a century, indicates why the DRVN failed to observe many of its legal
obligations under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, to which Hanoi was,
and is, a party; and why its behavior in the Vietnam war was not made legal by
its reservation to Article 85 of the Third Convention pertaining to the end of
prisoner-of-war protection upon conviction for war crimes.
4
The more generally significant point about the DRVN's position at the
Diplomatic Conference is that the position failed to muster support. Neither
the Soviet-led group nor the People's Republic of China (in the one session it
attended) supported Hanoi's stand. Likewise, Third World states and national
liberation movements did not support the DRVN despite their pronounced
sympathies for anti-imperial efforts. Several representatives referred to the
DRVN document in debates on mercenaries. But, in general, the document
became a dead letter; not even the DRVN spoke in its favor, such was the dis-
tance between its contents and sentiment in the Conference.
Wars of National Liberation
In 1974 a draft article was adopted in commission which emerged un-
'CDDH/41. This DRVN document consists of a five-page statement of "Basic Considera-
tions," followed by seven pages of detailed amendments to the draft Protocol presented by the
ICRC.
'Debates about Hanoi's reservation to Article 85 are legalistic, missing as they do the overriding
approach to such questions found in CDDH/41. The fact remains, as Professor Howard Levie has
so well demonstrated, that Hanoi's behavior toward American pilots was not legal since under
socialist reservations a detained combatant must be convicted of war crimes before, in their view,
the protection of the Third Convention ceases.
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changed from the final plenary in 1977 pertaining to the "material field of ap-
plication" of Protocol I on international armed conflict. This first article spe-
cified the material or factual situation covered by the Protocol. As such it
defined international war. A number of delegations, mostly if not entirely
Western, charged that this article interjected considerations on just wars into
jus in bello. These delegations asserted that in the light of Article I certain
wars, "in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien oc-
cupation and against racism regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination," were international because of the "just" cause pursued. Said
to be cast aside was the traditional definition of international war based on ac-
tors involved (states) and territory (international boundary crossed).
Elsewhere this author has analyzed this debate at some length., Suffice it
here to say that Article 1 of Protocol I can be entirely understood without
reference to just wars, aggression or self-defense. Violent action against
"colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes" block-
ing "self-determination" can be considered, factually speaking, international
situations to which the international laws of war should apply. Colonialism is,
after all, an international process in fact. Portugal needed to engage in inter-
continental action to establish and maintain African colonies; it needed in-
ternational support (from NATO) to do so; and it faced international opposi-
tion (including internationally supported and executed violence) in so doing. It
is, therefore, not factually unreasonable to have regarded violence in support
of liberation for Mozambique et. aL. as constituting international armed con-
flict. Similar arguments could reasonably be made-based on material facts-
regarding the international nature of foreign domination (i.e., Turkey in
Cyprus; Israel in the Golan). And the United Nations Security Council has
already determined that the racist regime in Rhodesia is an international sub-
ject matter and comprises a threat to international peace and security (and who
can reasonably deny the international nature of the violence involving
Rhodesia?).
The above paragraph is not to say that third world states, at the Conference
-supported by the Soviet-led coalition-were simply interested in accurately
linking international law to international facts. Their language was often the
language of the just war. They did want increased status-as conferred by
law-for liberation movements and their "freedom fighters." They did want
to bind Rhodesia, South Africa, and Israel with more legal restrictions. And
much of the Third World did not want more international law to regulate in-
ternal wars in their nations-wars which were frequently as international in
fact as wars of national liberation against colonialism, occupation, or racism
'The 1974 Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69 A.J.I.L. 77 (1975).
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blocking self-determination. 6 The Third World was clearly trying to use
"humanitarian law" to impede Rhodesia, South Africa, and Israel, and to
promote the cause of the PLO, PAC, and ANC.
But almost all states seek to tailor humanitarian law to their interests.
Nuclear states make announcements protecting the nuclear option from the
rules of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. States that rely on conven-
tional military force protect the effective use of that option. And, in the last
analysis, it is relatively easy to understand Article 1 of Protocol I without
reference to "just war" ideas. One can admit with accuracy that the situations
described as international armed conflicts by Protocol I are indeed interna-
tional in fact, and then apply the rules of the Protocol to all paties equally. No
deviation from a humanitarian jus in bello traditionally conceived and sup-
ported is involved.
Mercenaries
Much of the Third World-and the East Europeans-seemed at times to
regard mercenaries as beyond the pale of humanitarian concern.' At the sec-
ond session of the Conference in 1975, the Nigerian representative had
said: "It was to be hoped that the term [in a Norwegian proposal pertaining to
protection of fighters] did not mean mercenaries, for they had no right to pro-
tection, even out of humanitarian consideration."I Likewise did India9 and the
Ivory Coast,'" among others, regard mercenaries as not worthy of humani-
tarian protection and assistance.
The Eastern Europeans spoke at length in support of this Third World posi-
tion. A long statement by the Ukrainian delegate was, if anything, even more
sweeping in its denunciation of mercenaries than statements by third world
states.' The Eastern Europeans also proposed to exclude explicitly merce-
naries from humanitarian protection under Protocol II on internal war,2
although this effort did not succeed.
6An anlaysis of third world opposition to more law on non-international armed conflict, is set
forth in the present writer's Legal Regulation of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-
International Armed Conflict, to be published.
'For background-see Henry W. Van Deventer, Mercenaries At Geneva, 70 A.J.I.L. 811 (1976).
'CDDH/lll/SR.34, 24 March 1975, p. 30.
'Ibid., p. 29.
1"CDDH/lll/SR.36, 25 March 1975, pp. 2-3.
''CDDH/lll/SR.34. The Ukrainian delegate stated, inter alia, "The draft Protocols ought to
indicate that mercenaries did not benefit from the status of combatant and should be regarded as
criminals, with all that entailed .... It-was now established in the Protocols that there were three
main categories of combatant, namely regular armed forces, national liberation movements and
mercenaries. To accord mercenaries the safeguards offered to the other categories would be con-
trary to the rules of existing international law and also to the resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly and the Security Council."
"See the Ukrainian statement in CDDH/I/SR.34, 16-17.
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Here was a clear case of interjecting considerations of motivation and basic
cause into humanitarian jus in bello. Said the representative of ZAPU (Zim-
babwe African People's Union), raising a rhetorical question about certain
combatants: "Or were they mercenaries claiming the status of prisoners-of-
war while they fought solely for ignoble causes of selfishness and greed?"' 3
Western delegations struggled against this trend, and largely through their
efforts-with the American chief of delegation playing a central role-a com-
promise was reached. Mercenaries were not to be considered, legally, as either
prisoners-of-war or other "combatants under Article 47."" But mercenaries
were to be granted certain fundamental rights under Article 75 even if they
were to be denied the rights of "prisoners-of-war" or other "combatants." 5
This arrangement is not found explicitly in the Protocol on international war.
But the linkage was articulated, without challenge, by a number of Western
delegations. 6 In 1977 the Nigerian delegate said: "While recognizing the fun-
damental guarantees provided for in the new Article [75] of Protocol I and not
denying the common humanity which mercenaries shared with the rest of
mankind, he did not think that such considerations could serve as a pretext for
giving mercenaries the rights of combatants ot prisoners-of-war in any situa-
tion of armed conflict."' 7 The Canadian delegate sought to make the legisla-
tive history more clear by stating that he "welcomed the recognition by the
Nigerian representative that mercenaries were entitled to the fundamental
guarantees provided in Article [75]."'1 There was no challenge to this inter-
pretation.
Conclusion
At the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, there were in-
deed attempts to erase the traditional distinction between a humanitarian jus
in bello and jus contra bellum. But none of these attempts succeeded, in the
final version of the Protocols, in denigrating this traditional distinction so fun-
damental to an effective law-of-war. The most general attempt by the DRVN
(by 1977 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) got nowhere. The more limited at-
I3CDDH/Ill/SR.36, 19.
'Article 47: Mercenaries. Paragraph 1. "A mercenary shall not have the right to be a com-
batant or a prisoner of war." In paragraph 2 there follows a six-part definition of a mercenary.
'Article 75: Fundamental guarantees. Paragraph I. "In so far as they are affected by a situa-
tion referred to in Article I of this Protocol [material field of application], persons who are in the
power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances .. " Three
paragraphs follow detailing the minimum definition of humane treatment. The last paragraph
alone entails ten specific norms.
'See the statements in CDDH/SR.41; and CDDH/SR.43.
"CDDH/SR.41, p. 23.
"Ibid., p. 26.
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tempt to put mercenaries beyond the pale did not succeed; they were afforded
humanitarian rights even though symbolically they were assigned to a tertiary
position behind prisoners-of-war and other "combatants." And Article 1 of
Protocol I can be, and should be, understood without reference to causes of
war.
Some of the states that were in the process of blurring the distinction be-
tween the two bodies of law submitted a proposal in 1975 apparently intended
to "paper over" differences of opinion and reassure the West.' 9 This proposed
amendment expressed opposition to wars of aggression while paying lip service
to traditional humanitarian law in principle. The proposal led nowhere, but it
did support-on paper-the traditional distinction.
One can be pessimistic about the events at Geneva briefly examined here. It
was clear that most governmental delegations did not regard humanitarian law
as separate from machtpolitik. Certainly it was no reason for optimism to see
lawyers and diplomats try to fashion humanitarian law to meet past, present,
and future power struggles partly based on ideology and emotions. If lawyers
and diplomats found it so easy to curtail their humanitarian impulse in the
splendid isolation of this Diplomatic Conference, where interest from the press
and even home capitals was mostly lacking, how much more likely would it be
for that humanitarian impulse to be curtailed to the point of extinction on the
battlefield.
Yet, from the legal perspective, a textual analysis of the Protocols, sup-
ported by an examination of their legislative history, reveals that the tradition-
al distinction between jus in belto and jus in contra belum is still intact. The
greatest number of states at the Conference finally accepted that distinction, at
least insofar as the law on the books is concerned. We still know little about
the future behavior of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (in the light of its
early proposal); or about the People's Republic of China (in the light of its not
attending the latter three sessions); or about the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (in the light of its silence on most issues at the Conference). But it is
likely that most states will sign, ratify, or otherwise adhere to at least Protocol
I on international armed conflict, in which case they will have reaffirmed and
developed humanitarian jus in bello as traditionally understood.
"CDDH/III/284. This 18-power draft, sponsored by the East Europeans plus Algeria, Egypt,
Bangladesh, North Korea, Iraq, the PLO, and the Sudan, stated in part, "They [the High Con-
tracting Parties] agree that the protections accorded by the Geneva Conventions on the protection
of victims of war of 1949 and by this Protocol shall be extended without any discrimination to all
victims of the conflict without regard to the causes espoused by the party to which they belong."
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